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Capital Punishment and the Courts-Martial:
Questions Surface Following
Loving v. United States
Christine Daniels*
I Introduction
On June 3, 1996, the United States Supreme Court upheld the death
sentence of Dwight J. Loving.' As to this ultimate conclusion, all nine Jus-
tices agreed.2 However, the inclusion of several concurring opinions indicated
a lack of consensus among the members of the Court concerning the founda-
tion of the decision.3 Throughout the four separate opinions suggestions
emerged that counsel neglected two issues4 that might have altered the out-
come of the case.' The first neglected issue concerns the constitutionality of
court-martial jurisdiction over common-law capital crimes committed during
times of peace.6 The second issue questions the legitimacy of the conclusion
that courts-martial should be bound by the same Eighth Amendment proce-
* I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Roger D. Groot for his patience and
guidance in the development of this Note.
1. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1751 (1996) (declaring "Loving's
sentence was lawful").
2. See id. at 1740 (detailing vote).
3. See id. (detailing vote). Although no Justice dissented from the majority opinion,
Lovingproduced anumber ofconcurrences. Id. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, Breyer, and
Chief Justice Rehnquistjoined Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. Id. Justice Scalia, joined
by Justice O'Connor, generally concurred with the majority, taking exception only with Part
IV.A. Id. Additionally, JusticeStevenswroteaseparateconcurrencethatJusticesBreyer, Souter,
and Ginsbergjoined. Id. Justice Thomas wrote separately to concur with thejudgment. Id.
4. See infra Parts III-IV (discussing two alternative issues not considered by Court).
5. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1742 (indicating that "[a] preliminary question in this case
is whether the Constitution requires the aggravating factors that Loving challenges"); id. at 1752
(Stevens, J., concurring) (reserving question of status of peacetime capital prosecutions by
military); id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring) (indicating that "lilt is not clear to me that the
extensive rules we have developed under the Eighth Amendment for the prosecution of civilian
capital cases, including the requirement of proof of aggravating factors, necessarily apply to
capital prosecutions in the military").
6. See id. at 1752 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reserving question of status of peacetime
capital prosecutions by military).
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 577 (1998)
dural restrictions that bind civilian courts addressing capital punishment
issues.7 Failure to raise either issue sealed Loving's fate, but, by providing a
forum for highlighting these issues, Loving presented two alternative avenues
ripe for exploration by future litigants.
Dwight J. Loving deserves neither more nor less sympathy than the
average death row inmate. In a crime spree spanning two days in December
1988, Loving robbed two convenience stores and three taxicab drivers.8
During the course of those robberies, two cab drivers suffered fatal gun shot
wounds to the head;9 the third struggled and escaped."° Convicted of both
premeditated and felony murder, as well as attempted murder and robbery,'
Loving awaits execution at the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. 2
Loving's status as a private in the United States Army at the time of his
crimes makes his story somewhat unusual. 3 He is among the few servicemen
sentenced to death by the military justice system since the enactment of the
7. See id. at 1742 (declaring necessity ofaggravators "preliminary question"); id. at 1753
(Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning application of civilian capital punishment procedures to
courts-martial).
8. See Brief for United States at 4-5, Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996)
(No. 94-1966) (detailing incidents); see also Army Private Gets Death in Cabdrivers 'Slayings,
Hous. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1989, at 18 [hereinafter Army Private] (discussing Loving's crimes);
Soldier Gets Death Verdict: 2 Cabdrivers 'Killer Faces Military Appeals, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 5, 1989, at 21A [hereinafter Soldier] (same).
9. See Brief for United States at 5, Loving (No. 94-1966) (detailing incidents); see also
Army Private, supra note 8, at 18 (identifying victims as 20-year-old Christopher Fay and 44-
year-old Bobby Sharbino); Soldier, supra note 8, at 21A (same). Both men were cabdrivers
with connections to Fort Hood. Army Private, supra note 8, at 18 (identifying Faye as private
and Sharbino as retired from army); Soldier, supra note 8, at 21A (same).
10. See Brief for United States at 5, Loving (No. 94-1966) (detailing incident); see also
Army Private, supra note 8, at 18 (identifying third man as 28-year-old Howard Harrison);
Soldier, supra note 8, at 21A (same). Officials indicated that Loving bit Harrison several times
before the cabdriver was able to escape. Army Private, supra note 8, at 18 (discussing bites "on
the head, hand and back"); Soldier, supra note 8, at 21A (same).
11. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1740 (discussing Loving's conviction and sentencing); Brief
for Petitioner at 3, Loving (No. 94-1966) (same); Brief for United States at 6, Loving (No. 94-
1966) (same); see also Army Private, supra note 8, at 18 (same); Soldier, supra note 8, at 21A
(same).
12. Telephone Interview with Janet Wray, Public Information Officer, United States
Disciplinary Barracks, in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (April 13, 1998) [hereinafter Wray]. See,
e.g., Army Private Given Death Sentence/Judge: ' hope God has mercy on youfor what you
did', Hous. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1989, at 17 (same); Soldier,-supra note 8, at 21A (discussing
Army's intentions to send Loving to Fort Leavenworth as soon as administratively possible);
Soldier Sentenced to Diefor Killing 2 Killeen Cabbies, AusTINAM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 4, 1989,
at Al (same).
13. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1740 (identifying Loving as "Army private stationed at Fort
Hood, Texas").
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Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) in 1950.14 The U.C.M.J. autho-
rizes capital punishment for those crimes particular to the military," along
with certain classes of murder. 6 The military has not executed anyone under
the.U.C.M.J. since April 13, 1961.7
Nevertheless, Private Loving may be one of the first servicemen executed
by order of a court-martial since 1961." After finding him guilty of pre-
meditated murder and felony murder under the U.C.M.J., 19 the court-martial
also found three aggravators under Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1004.20
14. See Cynthia Swarthout Conners, Comment, The Death Penalty in Military Courts:
Constitutionally Imposed?, 30 UCLA L. REv. 366, 367-69 (1982) (presenting military death
penalty under U.C.M.J. in its historical context and noting that since its enactment only 37
servicemen received death sentences, and of those 37, military executed 10). But see Death
Sentence Ledger (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (indicating 47 military
death sentences between 1950 and 1979); but see also Wray, supra note 12 (identifying 10
military executions between 1954 and 1961). These statistics suggest that the military com-
mutes the majority of capital sentences adjudged under the U.C.M.J. before final execution
takes place. See Conners, supra, at 369 n.20 (discussing instances of such commutations from
1955 to 1965). Attempts to locate a current version of the Death Sentence Ledger either at the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces or at the United States Disciplinary Barracks in Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, proved unsuccessful.
15. See Conners, supra note 14, at 367 & n.13 (discussing "eleven purely 'military'
crimes" for which capital punishment is available); see infra notes 252-59, 279-83 and accom-
panying text (discussing military crimes).
16. See Conners, supra note 14, at 367 n. 12 (noting specifically capital punishment provi-
sions for premeditated and felony murder). Either premeditated or felony crime may independ-
ently warrant a death sentence. U.C.M.J. art. 118(1), (4), 10 U.S.C. § 918(1), (4) (1994); Brief
forPetitionerat3,Lovingv.United States, 116S. Ct. 1737(1996)(No. 94-1966). PrivateDwight
Loving was convicted ofboth. Seesupra note 11 and accompanyingtext (discussing conviction).
17. Wray, supra note 12; see Conners, supra note 14, at 369 & n.19 (identifying Private
First Class John Bennett as executed prisoner). Currently, eight prisoners, including Loving,
await execution on Fort Leavenworth's death row. Wray, supra note 12. Four were Army
personnel, one was a member of the Air Force, and three were Marines. Id. All eight received
death sentences following murder convictions. Id.
18. Loving's execution depends on President Clinton's approval. Following completion
of all appeals, up to and including resolution of any petition to the Supreme Court, U.C.M.J.
art. 71(a) mandates that all military death sentences be approved by the President. See 2
FRANcIs A. GILLIGAN & FREDEuc I. LEDERER, COURT-MARnAL PROCEDURE, § 25-100.00, at
174 & nn.323,.327 (1991) (explaining appeal procedure); see also U.C.M.J. art. 71(c), 10
U.S.C. § 871(c) (defining point at which all appeals are complete).
19. See U.C.M.J. arts. 118(1), (4), 10U.S.C. § 918(1), (4) (prohibiting premeditated and
felony murder respectively).
20. Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1740 (1996). The Court stated:
In the sentencing phase of the trial, the court-martial found three aggravating
factors: (1) that the premeditated murder of the second driver was committed
during the course of a robbery, Rule for Courts-Martial (RCM) 1004(c)(7)(B);
(2) that Loving acted as the triggerman in the felony murder of the first driver,
RCM 1004(c)(8); and (3) that Loving, having been found guilty of the premeditated
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Pursuant to these findings, Private Loving received the death penalty."
In light of the facts, it seems surprising that the decision in Loving v.
United States22 appears more relevant to administrative law than to criminal
or military law. Throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court expounds on the
tried and true wisdom of separation of powersP and grounds its holding on an
interpretation of the delegation doctrine.24 Part II of this Note briefly consid-
ers this aspect of the decision. Parts III and IV, however, explore two entirely
different issues that the majority and concurring opinions suggest might have
altered the findings in this case.' Herein lies the true significance of Loving.
Part III suggests that military tribunals lack jurisdiction during peacetime to
hear common-law capital cases such as Private Loving's. Part IV considers
whether civilian precedent concerning restrictions on the implementation of
capital punishment applies to death penalty cases within the military justice
system. Both of these issues could have far reaching implications in future
capital cases involving military personnel. The resolution of these issues will
be particularly significant with respect to choice of forum for the disposition
of capital cases where the death penalty is the desired result. Furthermore,
changes in capital punishment within the military justice system may provide
an avenue for the more conservative members of the Court to seek to diminish
current procedural requirements for civilian application of the death penalty.
Part V discusses these possible implications.
Il The Role of the Delegation Doctrine
By the time Private Loving's case reached the Supreme Court,26 his issue
murder, had committed a second murder, also proven at the single trial, RCM
1004(c)(7)(J).
Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 3, Loving (No. 94-1966) (listing these R.C.M. provisions).
21. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1740 (noting that "[tihe court-martial sentenced Loving to
death").
22. 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996).
23. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1743 (1996) (portraying delegation
doctrine not only as "[d]eterrence of arbitrary or tyrannical rule," but also as resulting in "a
National Government that is both effective and accountable").
24. See id. at 1749 (holding that Congress may delegate to President power to prescribe
aggravating factors to be used in implementing capital punishmentwithin military court system).
25. See id. at 1742 (noting failure of Govemment to contest issue concerning applicability
ofcivilian precedent); id. at 1751 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that as "Justice Scaliacorrectly
points out, petitionerhas not challenged thepower ofthetribunaltotryhim for acapital offense").
26. United States v. Loving, 34 M.J. 956 (A.C.M.R.), reh'g denied, 34 M.J. 1065
(A.C.M.R. 1992), aft'd, 41 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 1994), opinion modified on reh'g, 42 M.J. 109
(C.A.A.F. 1995), and affd, 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996); see also Brieffor the Petitioner at 1, Loving
(No. 94-1966) (listing these opinions); Brief for the United States at 1, Loving (No. 94-1966)
(same).
CAPITAL PUNISHMENTAND THE COURTS-MAJRTIL
lacked the emotional appeal of some death penalty cases.27 Loving challenged
the constitutionality of the military justice system's procedure for instituting
capital punishment.28 Using both the separation of powers doctrine and the
Eighth Amendment, Loving argued that the military's death penalty procedure
involved an unconstitutional congressional delegation.29 The contested dele-
gation concerned the power granted by Congress to the President to establish
aggravating factors for consideration in military capital cases."
Exercising this power, President Ronald Reagan promulgated R.C.M.
1004 by Executive Order in 1984.3" He did so in response to the United States
Court of Military Appeals' mandate in UnitedStates v. Matthews.32 Matthews
gave Congress or, in the alternative, the President ninety days to rectify what
the Court of Military Appeals identified as the constitutional defects in courts-
martial capital punishment procedure.33
27. See generally Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (considering constitutionality
of State's administration of anti-psychotic drugs against the will of defendant in capital murder
trial); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (considering constitutionality of testimony by
victim's family and argument by prosecution at sentencing phase of capital murder trial that
focused on effects of crime on three year old boy whose mother and sister were killed).
28. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1742 (describing "the scheme [that] Loving attacks as
unconstitutional").
29. See id. (setting out argument).
30. See id. (describing Loving's contention "that the Eighth Amendment and the doctrine
of separation of powers require that Congress, and not the President, make the fundamental
policy determination respecting the factors that warrant the death penalty").
31. See id. (designating R.C.M. 1004 as response to United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J.
354 (C.M.A. 1983)).
32. 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983).
33. United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354, 382 (C.M.A. 1983) (finding death penalty
wrongly imposed where procedures followed in its imposition were deemed unconstitutional).
In Matthews, the United States Court of Military Appeals considered the constitutionality of the
procedures followed by the military court system for imposing capital punishment. Id at 377-
80. A general court-martial convicted Private First Class Wyatt L. Matthews of the premedi-
tated murder and rape of Phyllis Jean Villanueva, an Army librarian, on an American military
base in the Federal Republic of Germany and sentenced Matthews to death. Id. at 359-61.
After dispensing with several claims of error in the trial's presentencing phases and affirming
its own authority to rule on the constitutionality of the U.C.M.J. despite its status as an Article
I court, the Court of Military Appeals undertook an analysis of Supreme Court capital punish-
mentprecedentbeginningwithFurmanv. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Id. at 362-68. While
it found that many aspects of the military's system offer as much and in some cases more
protection than Furman required, the court concluded the system was deficient in its failure to
require stipulation of specific aggravators. Id. at 377-79. Based on that finding, the court held
Matthew's death sentence "improperly adjudged," but provided for the reinstitution of that
sentence pursuant to a rehearing to be held within 90 days in accordance with a new, constitu-
tionally acceptable procedure should Congress or the President institute one within that period
of time. Id. at 382.
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R.C.M. 1004 requires a court-martial to make three distinct unanimous
findings before sentencing an individual to death.34 First, a court-martial must
identify guilt with respect to a capital offense. 5 Next, it must find the exis-
tence of at least one or more specific aggravators.36 Finally, it must balance
the aggravating factor or factors against any mitigation that substantially
weighs against the aggravator.37 R.C.M. 1004 provides the list of potential
aggravators that a court-martial contemplating imposition of the death penalty
must consider." Additionally, R.C.M. 1004 authorizes courts-martial to
consider a wide range of evidence of extenuating and mitigating circum-
stances39 and provides instruction concerning the weight that the court-martial
must give such evidence.4"
According to the Court, Loving based his claim regarding the unconstitu-
tionality of the military's capital punishment scheme on three arguments.41
First, Loving contended that allowing the President to establish the aggrava-
tors to be used in implementing military capital punishment constituted an
34. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1742 (1996) (listing required findings).
35. See R.C.M. 1004(a)(2) (requiring that "[t]he accused [be] convicted of such an
offense by the concurrence of all the members of the court-martial present at the time the vote
was taken"); Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1742 (citing R.C.M. 1,004(a)(2)).
36. See R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(A) (requiring that "members find at least one ofthe aggravat-
ing factors under subsection (c) existed"); Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1742 (citing R.C.M. 1004(b)).
37. See R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(C) (requiring that "[a]ll members concur that any extenuating
or mitigating circumstances are substantially outweighed by any aggravating circumstances
admissible under R.C.M. 1004(b)(4), including the factors under subsection (c) of this rule");
Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1742 (citing R.C.M. 1004(b)).
38. See R.C.M. 1004(c) (listing 11 aggravating factors); Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1742
(noting that "R.C.M. 1004(c) enumerates 11 categories of aggravating factors sufficient for
imposition of the death penalty").
39. See R.C.M. 1004(b)(3) (requiring that "accused shall be given broad latitude to
present evidence in extenuation and mitigation"); Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1742 (quoting R.C.M.
1004(b)(3)).
40. See R.C.M. 1004(b)(6) (requiring that "military judge shall instruct the members
that they must consider all evidence in extenuation and mitigation before they may adjudge the
death penalty"); Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1742 (1996) (citing RtC.M.
1004(b)(6)).
41. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1744 (setting out Loving's arguments). While in essence
the same as those arguments detailed by the Court, Loving's brief actually sets forth his argu-
ment somewhat differently. Brief for Petitioner at ii, Loving (No. 94-1966). His version is a
four pronged claim: (1) that explicit action is necessary for delegations that implicate aperson's
Fifth and Eighth Amendment liberty interests; (2) that history and precedent run contrary to the
recognition of an implicit delegation; (3) that, if there is an implicit delegation, it lacks a
sufficient, intelligible principle; and (4) that this decision is simply beyond delegation. Id at
ii-v. The Court in this instance appears to have better formulated the essence of Loving's own
argument.
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impermissible delegation of legislative authority.42 Next, Loving argued that
if the Constitution does permit such a delegation of authority, Congress failed
to effectuate a delegation in this instance.43 Finally, Loving argued that, if the
Court found that Congress did effectuate a delegation by statute, the Court
should nevertheless strike it down based on lack of a sufficient intelligible
principle to curb presidential discretion."
The Government countered, arguing that the Constitution does not
mandate that Congress participate in decision making with respect to the
scope of military capital punishment.4" Consequently, the congressional
delegation at issue must be constitutional.46 Furthermore, the Government
contended that Congress did delegate the authority for the President to pro-
mulgate R.C.M. 1004 through U.C.M.J. Articles 18 and 56.4' Finally, the
Government offered evidence that the delegation involved sufficient guidance
to the President in his exercise of that power.48
With the exception of Justice Thomas, the Court held that Congress
could and did delegate its authority to delineate aggravating factors.49 In
support of the first part of the Court's holding, Justice Kennedy engaged in a
fairly detailed review of the history of the death penalty in the military con-
text.5" In the end, he concluded that neither the Constitution nor tradition
prevented this delegation."
42. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1744 (presenting Loving's impermissible delegation argu-
ment).
43. See id. (presenting Loving's failure to effectuate argument).
44. See id (presenting Loving's lack of intelligible principle argument).
45. See Brief for United States at 13-34, Loving (No. 94-1966) (devoting entire section
to assertion).
46. See id. at 8 (stating affirmatively that "[i]t does not violate the separation-of-powers
doctrine or the Eighth Amendment").
47. See id. at 8-9 (attributing Articles 18 and 56 with notion "that the President may limit
the punishment that courts-martial may impose").
48. See id at 10 (discussing Congress'spresumed knowledge of"considerationsthattradi-
tionally have controlled similar exercises ofhis discretion" when passing those sections of Code
and reference in U.C.M.J. art. 36(a) to "'principles of law.. . generally recognized' by federal
district courts"). The Government asserted that these principles of law would include Supreme
Court rulings concerning the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
as well as other capital punishment statutes that had passed constitutional muster. Id.
49. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737,1749 (1996) (holding that (1) "Congress
has the power of delegation" and that (2) "it exercised the power in... the U.C.M.J.").
50. See id. at 1744-49 (considering historical background ofmilitary capital punishment).
51. See id. at 1749 (concluding that "[t]here is nothing in the constitutional scheme or our
traditions to prohibit Congress from delegating the prudent and proper implementation of the
capital murder statute to the President acting as Commander in Chief'). Justices Scalia and
O'Connoroptednottojoininthishistorical review. Id. at 1752 (Scalia, J., concurring) (character-
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With respect to the Court's determination that delegation took place in
this instance, Justice Kennedy first considered evidence of Congress's intent
to delegate.52 Next, he discussed the existence of the intelligible principle that
must accompany a constitutional delegation of legislative authority.53 The
Court identified the necessary congressional intent in three articles of the
U.C.M.J. 54 The first two, U.C.M.J. Articles 18 and 56, provide the President
with the authority to raise criminal penalties under certain circumstances.55
The Court treated this authority as evidence of a comparable authority on the
part of the President to narrow, through aggravators, the field of murderers
eligible for capital punishment.56
The Court found that the third article, U.C.M.J. Article 36, also lends
support to the finding of congressional intent to delegate its power to promul-
gate aggravating factors for the consideratioh of death sentences under the
U.C.M.J. 57 Article 36 provides the President with the authority to establish
court-martial procedures.58 Furthermore, Congress cited Article 36 as a
subsequent justification for this delegation.59 Loving emphasized that a later
izing itas irrelevant in light of lack of limitation placed on congressional delegation with respect
to this issue in Article 1, section 8, Clause 14, which governs congressional power in this area).
52. See id. at 1749 (asserting that, "[h]aving held that Congress has the power of delega-
tion, we further hold that it exercised the power").
53. See id. at 1750 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409
(1928) (finding that Congress must "lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform").
54. Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1749 (citing U.C.M.J. art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1994); U.C.M.J.
art 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836(a); U.C.M.J. art. 56, 10 U.S.C. § 856).
55. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1749 (1996) (discussing presidential
practice of using "[a]rticles to increase the penalties for certain noncapital offenses if aggravat-
ing circumstances are present" and suggesting parallel to present situation). In light of these
statutes, the Court determined that "[t]he President has thus provided more precision in
sentencing than is provided by the statute, while remaining within statutory bounds." 1d; see
U.C.M.J. art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1994) (authorizing courts-martial "under such limitations
as the President may prescribe, [to] adjudge any punishment not forbidden by [the U.C.M.J.],
including the penalty of death when specifically authorized" (emphasis added)); U.C.M.J. art.
56, 10 U.S.C. § 856 (stating that "punishment which a court-martial may direct for an offense
may not exceed such limits as the President may prescribe for that offense").
56. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1749 (discussing analogy).
57. See id. (discussing Article 36 as "indicative of congressional intent to delegate").
58. See id. (quoting U.C.M.J. art. 36(a), 10 U.S.C. § 836(a)); U.C.M.J. art 36(a), 10
U.S.C. § 836(a) (providing President with authority to establish court-martial procedures).
59. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1749 (noting that Article 36 "is the provision that a later
Congress identified as the source of Presidential authority to prescribe these factors"). After
passing Article 36, Congress passed U.C.M.J. Article 106(a), which authorizes capital pun-
ishment for espionage. U.C.M.J. art. 106(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1); Loving, 116 S. Ct.
at 1749. The statute makes reference to presidential authority under Article 36 to proscribe
aggravating factors authorizing capital punishment. U.C.M.J. art. 106(a)(3)(C)(4), 10 U.S.C.
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statute purporting to set forth the intent of preceding legislation warrants
significant consideration.'
As to the existence of an appropriate intelligible principle to guide the
President in exercising the delegated power, the Court rejected the notion that
it must find an "explicit principle" to do so in the context of determining ag-
gravators for the military.6' The majority questioned the necessity of specific
guidelines in light of the destination as well as the character of the delegation
involved.62 In finding specific guidelines unnecessary, the Court noted that
the nature of the presidential power pursuant to this delegation did have
particular limits.63 More importantly, the president serves as Commander in
Chief of the armed forces.6" This role necessarily implies a unique familiarity
with the situations involved in military discipline.6" This experience qualifies
him to develop aggravating factors for consideration in capital cases.'
In light of these findings, Loving fits comfortably within the Court's
jurisprudence concerning the delegation doctrine. Overbreadth served to
strike down only two delegations of congressional power in the history of the
Court,67 and both instances occurred within a unique historical context - the
New Deal.68 Since that time, the Court has upheld delegations far more
broadly based than the one at issue in Loving.69 Explaining the effect of
congressional delegations, Justice Kennedy asserted that "[s]eparation-of-
§ 906(a)(3)(C)(4); Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1749.
60. Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1749 (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvannia, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969))).
61. Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1750 (1996) (recasting question from
"whether there was any explicit principle telling the President how to select aggravating factors"
to "whether any such guidance was needed").
62. See id. (qualifying necessity of specific guidelines).
63. See id. (noting that "delegation is setwithin boundaries the Presidentmay not exceed").
64. See id. (emphasizing that "delegation here was to the President in his role as Com-
mander in Chief').
65. See id. (discussing requirementthatPresident "take responsible and continuing action
to superintend the military").
66. See id. at 1750 (referring to President's "undoubted competency to prescribe those
factors"). The opinion also emphasized the historical power Congress authorized and the
President exercised to intervene in military capital cases. Id. at 1751. The Court reasoned that
the President's structured involvement in military death penalty jurisprudence as a whole could
hardly be more offensive than his involvement on a case-by-case basis. Id.
67. See id. (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)).
68. See PETER L. STRAUSs ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES
AND COMMENTs 84-88 (1995) (discussing decisions in their historical context).
69. See Lovingv. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737,1750 (1996) (citingNationalBroadcast-
ing Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943)).
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powers principles are vindicated, not disserved, by measured cooperation
between the two political branches of the Government, each contributing to
a lawful objective through its own processes."70
IlI Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Capital Cases in Times of Peace
Settling the delegation question determined the fate of Private Loving.
The Court's attention to two additional issues, however, preventedLovingfrom
closing the book on capital punishment and the courts-martial. Depending on
their resolution, these issues may radically alter the outcome of future cases.
The first issue presents a threshold question: Is court-martial jurisdiction
over capital crimes that occur during peacetime legitimate? Speaking for the
Loving majority, Justice Kennedy failed to address directly the legitimacy of
the courts-martial'sjurisdiction.7' However, Justice Stevens, in a concurrence
joined by three of his colleagues, expressly reserved the question of the status
of peacetime capital prosecutions by the military.72 Arguably, though, the
majority opinion's historical review implicitly addressed this question. 3
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, took issue with the majority's
review on the grounds that Private Loving failed to raise the question of the
legitimacy of court-martial jurisdiction for the Court's consideration.74 No
consensus emerged on the issue. Nevertheless, in the minds of several of the
Justices - perhaps even a majority - the scope of military jurisdiction with
respect to peacetime capital crimes appears to remain open for consideration.
A. The History of Court-Martial Jurisdiction in the United States
Jurisdiction of courts-martial in the United States has undergone signifi-
cant evolution since the inception of American military justice.75 The First
70. Id. at 1751.
71. See id. at 1740-51 (containing no direct reference to legitimacy of courts-martial
jurisdiction).
72. See id. at 1751-52 (Stevens, J., concurring) (raising issue and indicating that it
"remains to be decided").
73. See id. at 1741 (tracing capital jurisdiction of courts-martial inAmerican history); id.
at 1744-49 (reviewing history of military capital punishment in England and its effect on similar
practices in United States); id. at 1752 (Scalia, J., concurring) (linking historical discussion to
jurisdiction question).
74. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that "[p]etitioner does not assert that tradition
establishes his offense to be, in its nature, beyond the jurisdiction of military courts, or that
courts-martial are historically incapable of adjudicating capital offenses").
75. See Robert D. Duke & Howard S. Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army:
Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND.L. REV. 435,441 (1960) (discussing
evolution as evidence of lack of intent on part of framers that military tribunals should super-
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Congress officially legislated the Articles of War in 1789, taking them directly
from those adopted by the Continental Congress in 1776.76 Unaffected by the
adoption of the Constitution, legislators designed American courts-martial jur-
isdiction to achieve the aims of a disciplined military and nothing more.' In
addition to provisions "earnestly recommend[ing] to all officers and soldiers
diligently to attend divine service '78 and prohibiting drunkenness on the part
of a "commissioned officer.., on his guard, party, or other duty under arms,"
79
the 1776 Articles of War limited courts-martial jurisdiction to two areas -
(1)noncapital crimes that endangered good order and discipline and (2) purely
military capital crimes."0 At the request of the aggrieved party, the superiors
of military personnel accused of crimes unrelated to their military service
were to deliver the accused to civilian courts." Arguably, the First Congress
intended such provisions to limit courts-martial to situations involving mili-
tary matters "and in other respects to give precedence to the civil authori-
ties.
'8 2
The first significant development in the evolution of courts-martial juris-
diction occurred in the midst of one of the most turbulent periods in United
States history, the War Between the States. 3 Pursuant to an 1863 statute, 4
Congress empowered courts-martial to rule on a variety of civil crimes "in
cede civilian justice with respect to crimes unrelated to military).
76. See Loving v. United States, 1737, 1741 (1996) (citing Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25,
§ 4, 1 Stat. 96).
77. See Brief of United States Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Defense Division at 22,
Loving (No. 94-1966) (discussing Articles of War of 1775).
78. American Articles of War of 1776, § I, art. 2, reprinted in WILLIAM WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 961 (2d ed. 1920).
79. Id. at § XIII, art. 5., reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 78, at 966.
80. See Brief ofthe United States Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Defense Division at 22,
Loving (No. 94-1966) (discussing courts-martial jurisdiction); see also Loving, 116 S. Ct. at
1741 (indicating 14 such military capital offenses).
81. See American Articles of War of 1776, § X, art.I, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note
78, at 964 (providing for this); see also Duke & Vogel, supra note 75, at 445 n.48 (quoting
British Articles of War, 1765, § 11, art. 1, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 78, at 931, 937)
(noting its similarity to Section 10, Article 1 of American Articles).
82. Duke & Vogel, supra note 75, at 445 (attributing this purpose to British Articles of
War and drawing parallel between like provisions in both British and American versions); see
also Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1741 (1996) (noting "supremacy of civil court
jurisdiction over ordinary capital crimes that were punishable by the law of the land and were
not special military offenses").
83. See Brief for the Petitioner at 14, Loving (No. 94-1966) (noting that Civil War was
"first time that Congress permitted the military to try a servicemember for the civilian capital
offense of murder").
84. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, § 30, 12 Stat. 736, Rev. Stat § 1342, art. 58 (1875).
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time of war, insurrection or rebellion."85 Admittedly, the extended jurisdic-
tion included authority over capital crimes with no direct relationship to the
military.86 Thisjurisdiction's temporal restrictions, however, warrant careful
consideration. Purely an emergency measure, 7 Congress did not intend
courts-martial to exercise jurisdiction over civilian offenses "when 'the civil
courts were open and in the undisturbed exercise of their jurisdiction.' 1
8
Along with a provision abandoningThe practice of relinquishing offenders to
civil courts 9 during periods of instability, Congress incorporated the essence
of the 1863 statute in the Articles of War of 1874.90
Congress took one step further in the Articles of War of 1916 by extend-
ing the domestic jurisdiction of courts-martial to include peacetime viola-
tions of noncapital common-law crimes by military personnel.9 Rape and
murder, the capital crimes, remained a part of civilian jurisdiction' when
committed on American soil. As before, the 1916 Articles required that the
85. Duke & Vogel, supra note 75, at 449-50 (quoting Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30;
12 Stat. 736, Rev. Stat. § 1342, art. 58 (1875)); see also Brief for the Petitioner at 14, Loving
(No. 94-1966) (citing Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513 (1878)).
86. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1741 (specifying "common-law capital crimes"); Duke &
Vogel, supra note 75, at 449-50 (referring to "various civil crimes"); Brief for the Petitioner at
14, Loving (No. 94-1966) (specifying "the civilian capital offense of murder").
87. See Duke & Vogel, supra note 75, at 450 (noting statute provided for death penalty
only during war and similar situations). It appears the statute was intended
not merely to insure order and discipline among the men composing those forces,
but to protect the citizens not in the military service from the violence of soldiers.
It is a matter well known that the march even of an army not hostile is often accom-
panied with acts of violence and pillage by straggling parties of soldiers, which the
most rigid discipline is hardly able to prevent. The offenses mentioned are those
of the most common occurrence, and the swift and summary justice of a military
court was deemed necessary to restrain their commission.
Id. at 450 (quoting Coleman, 97 U.S. at 513).
88. See Brief for Petitioner at 15, Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996) (No. 94-
1966) (quoting Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 386 (1920) (quoting Coleman, 97 U.S. at515)).
89. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing practice of relinquishing
attenders to civil courts).
90. See Duke & Vogel, supra note 75, at 450-51 nn.81-82 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1863,
§ 30, 12 Stat. 736, Rev. Stat. § 1342, art. 58 (1875) (respecting essence of 1863 statute) and Act
of Mar. 3, 1863, § 30, 12 Stat. 736, Rev. Stat. § 1342, art. 58 (1875) (respecting necessity of
turning over offenders to civil courts)).
91. Articles of War of 1916, ch. 418, § 3, arts. 92-93, 30 Stat. 664, construed in Loving,
116 S. Ct. at 1741; see Duke & Vogel, supra note 75, at 451 (noting that extension was one of
several significant changes).
92. Articles of War of 1916, art. 74,39 Stat. 662, construed in Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1741;
see Duke & Vogel, supra note 75, at 452 (indicating rejection of notion that court-martial
jurisdiction should extend to domestic rape and murder cases as well).
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commanding officers of military personnel accused of those capital crimes
relinquish them to civil authorities.' Courts-martial, however, still lacked
jurisdiction over those offenders charged with murder or rape outside of the
nation's borders.9" The final move towards courts-martial's peacetime juris-
diction over all crimes perpetrated by members of the armed forces came on
May 31, 1951, when the U.C.M.J. took effect.9" Under the U.C.M.J., Con-
gress gave the courts-martial the power to prescribe the punishment of death
for those military personnel found guilty of premeditated murder, felony
murder, and rape,96 regardless of the locus of the crime or the state of the
union at the time of its commission. Despite more than one hundred years of
unwillingness on the part of Congress to approve courts-martial jurisdiction
over peacetime common-law capital crimes, legislators engaged in little
discussion of the matter prior to the enactment of the U.C.M.J.9 7
Considered independently, conclusions drawn from this historical evolu-
tion may appear insignificant.9" However, evaluating historical changes in
the nature and scope of courts-martial jurisdiction in conjunction with current
legal trends is a sound approach.9
93. Articles of War of 1916, art. 74,39 Stat 662, construed in Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1741;
see Duke & Vogel, svpra note 75, at 452 (reiterating principle).
94. Articles of War of 1916, art. 92,39 Stat. 664, construed in Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1741;
see Duke & Vogel, supra note 75, at 452 (discussing controversy over court-martial jurisdic-
tion).
95. See WILLIAM B. AYCOCK & SEYMOUR W. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM CODE OF MLITARY JUsTIcE at Preface (1955) (noting date for U.C.M.J.'s
relevance to "new and significant changes ... in the field of military justice"). Actually, the
process was somewhat more complicated than that. For a review of the events leading up to
promulgation of the U.C.M.J. and the individuals involved, see generally I JONATHAN LURIE,
ARMING MILITARYJUsTICE: THE ORIGINS OF THEUNITED STATES COURTOF MILITARYAPPEALS,
1775-1950 (1992).
96. See U.C.M.J., arts. 118,120,10 U.S.C. §§ 918,920 (1994) (bestowingthis authority);
Loving, 116S. Ct at 1741 (quoting Article 118); AYCOCK& WURFEL,supra note 95, at292-96,
425 (discussing contents of articles 118 & 120); Duke & Vogel, supra note 75, at 453 (same).
97. See Duke & Vogel, supra note 75, at 453 & n.107 (citing Hearings on the Uniform
Code ofMilitary Justice Before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
81st Cong. 644 (1949) (statement of Richard H. Wells, Chairman, Special Committee on
Military Justice of the New York County Lawyers' Association) (noting only one objection
throughout "prolonged congressional hearings on the Uniform Code")).
98. See id. at 455-56 (noting that "[h]istory is not the controlling, much less the sole,
guide to constitutional interpretation" and "[a]n inquiry directed exclusively to the question of
whether or not the Constitutional Convention believed that courts-martial should exercise
jurisdiction over civil crimes misses the mark by a wide margin").
99. See id. at 456 (indicating relevance of historical consideration - extended back in
Duke & Vogel to English common law - with respect to courts-martial jurisdiction to modem
notions of democracy and right to jury trial).
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B. Support for Court-Martial Jurisdiction in Times of Peace
Authority for the existence and powers of the courts-martial, and conse-
quently their jurisdiction, emanates from Article I, Clause 14 of the United
States Constitution. Clause 14 grants Congress the power to "make all Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces."'" Through
the first half of the twentieth century, a single element - an individual's
military status - became the key factor in determining the constitutionality of
court-martial jurisdiction in a given case."' This purely textual approach
focused on the "natural meaning" of the constitutional language. 2 The status
of the accused drove the inquiry." Therefore, court-martial jurisdictioh
encompassed any individual fairly considered part of the "land and naval
Forces.""'4
100. See id. (framing issue as "whether clause 14, either alone or in conjunction with the
necessary and proper clause, gives to Congress the power to entrust courts-martial with
jurisdiction over both capital and non-capital civil crimes... committed by servicemen in time
of peace within the United States"); Andrew M. Ferris, Comment, Military Justice: Removing
the Probability of Unfairness, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 439, 442-43 (1994) (quoting Clause 14 and
noting its implications for allocation of power concerning military); see also Solorio v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435, 441 (1987) (discussing power of Congress with respect to military in
conjunction with other constitutional powers located in that section and determining that "[o]n
its face there is no indication that the grant of power in Clause 14 was any less plenary than the
grants of other authority to Congress in the same section").
101. See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 439 (citing Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 673 (1973)
(plurality opinion); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-41, 243
(1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1957) (plurality opinion); Grafton v. United States,
206 U.S. 333, 348 (1907); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114 (1895); and Smith v. Whitney,
116 U.S. 167, 183-85 (1886); and Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. (4 Wall.) 509,513-14 (1879),
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 123 (1866) and cross referencing United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955); Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1921); and Givens v.
Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11, 20-21 (1921)).
102. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 439 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1957); United
States ex reL Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955)).
103. See id. at 439-40 (quoting passage from Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,
361 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1960) for explanation of Court's textual approach).
104. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234,240-41 (1960) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14), quoted in Solorio, 483 U.S. at 439. The Court asserted that "military
jurisdiction has always been based on the 'status' of the accused, rather than on the nature of
the offense." Kinsella, 361 U.S. at 243, quoted in Solorio, 483 U.S. at 339; see AYCOCK &
WURFEL, supra note 95, at 38 (comparing civilian to military law and finding that "[u]nder the
civilian rule usually the locus of the offense is all important, the status of the accused not at all.
Under military law quite the reverse is true"). The Code coniains extensive guidance as to when
an individual qualifies for military status. Id. at 39 n.107 (quoting Art. 2, 50 U.S.C. § 552
(Supp. 1952)). Those individuals include:
all on active federal armed forces service regardless of component or assigned duty;
cadets and midshipmen; reserves on voluntary inactive duty training under an order
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The strictlytextual approachheld significant implications for Congress's
role in the military justice process. 10 The Constitution, after all, states: "The
Congress shall have Power ... To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces."'" It follows, therefore, that the
power to define the jurisdiction of the courts maintained by those forces
should rest with Congress as well. 07
Thus, the constitutional parameters of courts-martial jurisdiction ap-
peared well established. 18 In O 'Callahan v. Parker, 9 however, the Supreme
Court abandoned the strict, status-based, textual approach.' Instead, it
expressly so stating; retired regular personnel entitled to receive pay; retired reserve
personnel receiving armed force hospitalization; Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine
Corps Reserve personnel; prisoners sentenced by courts-martial and in armed forces
custody; prisoners of war in armed forces custody; Coast and Geodetic Survey,
Public Health Service and other organization personnel when assigned to and
serving with the armed forces; without the continental limits of the United States,
Alaska, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone and the Hawaiian and Virgin Islands all persons
serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces, or within an area
under the control of the Secretary of a Department; and, in time of war, all persons
serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.
Id. at 40.
105. See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 440 (defining Congress's role).
106. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (emphasis added).
107. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 440 (1987) (asserting that "[i]mplicit in
the military status test was the principle that determinations concerning the scope of court-
martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by servicemen was a matter reserved for Con-
gress"); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion), quoted in Solorio, 483
U.S. at 440 (observing existence of delicate balance between rights of servicemen and unique
demands of military and noting that "civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the
precise balance to be struck .... The framers entrusted that task to Congress").
108. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional parameters).
109. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
110. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), overruled by Soloriov. United States,
483 U.S. 435 (1987) (abandoning military status requirement). In O'Callahan, the Supreme
Court considered whether an individual's military status was enough to subject him to court-
martial jurisdiction for crimes that were unrelated to his military service. Id. at 261-62. The
case involved a sergeant who, while stationed with the Army in Hawaii, entered a hotel room
unlawfully and attempted to commit rape therein. Id. at 259-60. At the time of the crime, the
sergeant was off duty and was not in uniform. Id. at 259. His victim was a female child. Id.
at 260. Civilian authorities took the sergeant into custody, but relinquished him shortly
thereafter to their military counterparts. Id. A court-martial tried and convicted him for his
crimes, and he challenged those convictions in federal court by filing a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 260-61. In its decision on the matter, the Supreme Court focused on the importance of
an accused's constitutional right to ajury trial and demonstrated how trial by court-martial fails
to live up to a similar standard. Id. at 262-64. The Court affirmed the existence of military
courts, but asserted that "the justification for such a system rests on the special needs of the
military, and history teaches that expansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain
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adopted a new requirement for court-martial jurisdiction.' Pursuant to
O'Callahan, court-martial jurisdiction in a given case depended on some
connection between the offense and the accused's military service." 2 Thus,
the court-martial lacked the authority to try O'Callahan," 3 because his offense
did not occur on a military base or victimize another member of the
military."4 Following further clarification,"' this constitutional approach to
court-martial jurisdiction reigned for almost twenty years. In 1987, the
Supreme Court reconsidered its position." 6 Solorio v. United States"7 over-
ruled O'Callahan and restored a status based approach to court-martial juris-
diction." 8
Not to overrule precedent lightly,"9 the Solorio majority made three
primary arguments in support of O'Callahan's reversal. The Court based its
first argument on an interpretation of framers' intent. 2° The Court's second
argument challenged O'Callahan's use of historical evidence.'2 ' The Court's
carries with it a threat to liberty." Id. at 265. A review of the history of courts-martial in both
England and the United States, in which the dangers implicit in the military adjudication of civil
crimes were highlighted, followed. Id. at 268-72. Finally, the Court determined that there must
be a service connection implicit in the crime for courts-martial to have jurisdiction. Id. at 272.
111. See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 440 (discussing O'Callahan and citing Gosa v. Mayden, 361
U.S. 664, 673 (1973), calling jurisdictional requirement "new constitutional principle").
112. See id. at 440 (defining new jurisdictional principle).
113. See id. (discussing O'Callahan's holding).
114. See id. (discussing O'Callahan's holding).
115. See id. at 448 (citing Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.S.
355 (1971), following O'Callahan, which established factors for determining whether crime
maintained sufficient service connection for inclusion in military jurisdiction).
116. See id. at 436 (overruling O'Callahan).
117. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
118. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). In Solorio, the Supreme Court
reconsidered the service connection requirement for court-martial jurisdiction that it had
adopted in O'Callahan. Id. at 436. While stationed in two different locations with the Coast
Guard over a period of years, Solorio sexually molested several of his colleague's children. Id.
at 436-37. A court-martial was convened, but some of the charges against him were dismissed
on the basis that, having occurred at a private residence, the incidents involved did not meet the
service connection requirement. Id. at 437. For the reasons discussed infra notes 119-37 and
accompanying text, the Court overruled O'Callahan and rejected the service connection
requirement. Id. at 440-4 1.
119. But see id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring) (characterizing Court's decision to overrule
O'Callahan as "unwise"). Justice Stevens asserted that "such drastic action is only appropriate
when essential to the disposition of a case or controversy before the Court." Id. at 451-52
(Stevens, J., concurring). He claimed that this case did not require such action. Id. (Stevens,
J., concurring).
120. See id. at 441 (setting out framers' argument).
121. See id. at 442-47 (setting out historical argument).
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final argument relied on subsequent practical experience." The Court
revisited the constitutional power of Congress via Clause 14." As with the
natural meaning theory followed prior to O'Callahan,24 Solorio favored
a simple textual approach." s The Court quoted Alexander Hamilton in
support of the congressional powers pertaining to defense, arguing that
"[t]hese powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to
foresee or defme the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the corre-
spondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy
them."
12
Next, the Court took issue with the accuracy of O'Callahan's portrayal
of both English and American history." Contrary to the conclusion in
O'Callahan, the Solorio Court asserted that pursuant to the British Articles of
War Section XIV, Article XVI, courts-martial in England possessed some
measure of jurisdiction concerning infraction of civil law. 2' More impor-
tantly, Solorio pointed to evidence that American military tribunals exercised
similarjurisdiction around the same time. 29 That evidence led to two possible
theories. 3 ' The first theory contended that Section X, Article 1 of the Amer-
ican Articles of War of 1776, which provided for the delivery of offenders to
civil authorities "upon application by or on behalf of an injured party," implic-
itly allowed the military to retain and try defendants in the absence of a
122. See id. at 448-50 (setting out subsequent experience argument).
123. See id. at 441 (discussing Clause 14).
124. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (discussing natural meaning
theory).
125. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441 & n.4 (1987) (citing O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258,277 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 2 M.FARRANDTHERECoRDSOFTHE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 329-30 (1911); 5 J. ELLIOT, DEBATEs ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 443, 545 (1876)) (declaring that "there is no evidence in the debates over the
adoption of the Constitution that the framers intended the language of Clause 14 to be accorded
anything other than its plain meaning").
126. Id. at 441 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 152-54 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.
Bourne ed., 1947)).
127. See id. at 442-44 (characterizing O'Callahan's consideration of British history as
"less than accurate" and its consideration of American history as providing "even less support").
128. See id. at 443-44 (citing British Articles of War of 1774, reprinted in G. DAvIS,
MILTARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 581, 593 (3d rev. ed. 1915); Grant S. Nelson & James
E. Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An
Analysis ofO'Callahanv. Parker, 54MINN.L.REV. 1, 11 (1969); O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 269
& n.11)).
129. See id at 444 & n.8 (noting that "American military records reflect trials by court-
martial during the late 18th century for offenses.., such as theft and assault").
130. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (describing theories on exercise of
jurisdiction).
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request for civilian proceedings.' 3' The second theory entertained the possi-
bility that the general article of the Articles of War, referring to courts-martial
those offenses related "to the prejudice of good order and military disci-
pline,"'32 included any civilian crime not calling for capital punishment.'
Finally, Solorio relied on subsequent experience as a basis for overturn-
ing O'Callahan.' In practice, the service connection requirement proved
inefficient.'35 In determining whether there was a sufficient connection, too
many factors warranted consideration." 6 The result was time and resources
wasted on excessive litigation before either court system could consider the
offense at hand."7
C. Arguments Against Court-Martial Jurisdiction in Times of Peace
The Supreme Court's literal interpretation of the constitutional grant of
power to Congress in Clause 14,"3 in conjunction with its return to the status
test for determining jurisdiction,"' appears to favor broad court-martial
jurisdiction. Consequently, pursuant to Congress's authorization through the
U.C.M.J., a court-martial may try an offender who meets the requirements
associated with the status test. Although logical, this conclusion is far from
foregone. Concurring in Loving, Justice Stevens recognized two distinctions
between capital and noncapital crimes and reserved the question of peacetime
131. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435,444 & n.7 (1987) (attributing idea to various
scholars).
132. Id. at 444 (quoting American Articles of War of 1776, § XVIII, art. 5, reprinted in
WINTHROP, supra note 78, at 971).
133. See id. at 445 & n.10 (attributing this view to variety of authorities).
134. See id. at 448 (pointing to Justice Harlan's dissent in O'Callahan which anticipated
that "infinite permutations of possibly relevant factors are bound to create confusion and
proliferate litigation over the [court-martial] jurisdiction issue" (quoting O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258, 284 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
135. See id. at448 (noting that"[t]he notion that civil courts are 'ill equipped' to establish
policies regarding matters of military concern is substantiated by experience under the service
connection approach" (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983))).
136. See supra note 134 (discussing Justice Harlan's prediction in O'Callahan).
137. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 448-49 & n.13 (1987) (indicating that
despite attempt by Court in Relfordv. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.S. 355
(1971), to clarify service connection requirement, problems remained). Aspects of offenses that
were noted for particular complexity included proximity to base, "status ofthe victim," and drug
use. Id. at 449-50 & nn.14-17.
138. See id. at 446 (noting precedence given to Congress over President to govern mili-
tary).
139. Id. at 450-51 (holding that "requirements of the Constitution are not violated where,
as here, a court-martial is convened to try a serviceman who was a member of the Armed
Services at the time of the offense charged").
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jurisdiction over common law capital crimes on two bases.'4° First, he pointed
out that "Solorio was not a capital case." 4' He then contended that the history
presented in the Solorio case argues against the notion that capital and
noncapital jurisdiction require the same treatment.1
42
While not necessarily facially determinative of the common-law capital
peacetime jurisdiction issue, Justice Stevens's first distinction is at the very
least an obvious one. The Government charged Richard Solorio with twenty-
one violations of the U.C.M.J. for various indecencies and assaults as well as
attempted rape. 43 None of the applicable provisions calls for capital punish-
ment."4 Stare decisis requires courts to follow precedent when the facts are
identical or closely analogous.145 However, the distinction between capital
and noncapital crimes makes precedent relating to noncapital crimes, although
potentially relevant, nonbinding with respect to capital crimes. Justice Ste-
vens appears to agree.'46
The Supreme Court previously observed that participation in the Revolu-
tionary War influenced the perspective of the men who contributed to the
development of the Constitution. 47 Those experiences brought a clear under-
standing of the distinctive requirements demanded of military personnel in the
facilitation of an effective military. 4 Some of the most influential leaders
140. Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1751 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens indicated that
[t]he question whether a "service connection" requirement should obtain in capi-
tal cases is an open one both because Solorio was not a capital case, and because
Solorio's review of the historical materials would seem to undermine any conten-
tion that a military tribunal's power to try capital offenses must be as broad as its
power to try non-capital ones.
Id (emphasis added).
141. Id
142. See id. (citing Solorio, 483 U.S. at 442-46).
143. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435,438 n.1 (1987) (detailing charges against
Solorio under U.C.M.J., art. 80, 10 U.S.C. § 880 (1994); U.C.M.J., art. 128, 10 U.S.C. § 928;
U.C.M.J., art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934, none of which were capital); supra note 118 (describing
Solorio's crime).
144. See U.C.M.J., art. 80, 10 U.S.C. § 880 (failing to mention capital punishment);
U.C.M.J., art. 128, 10 U.S.C. § 928 (same); U.C.M.J., art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (disallowing
capital punishment).
145. See BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY 1406, 1176 (6th ed. 1990) (defining stare decisis and
precedent, respectively).
146. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1751 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(noting significance of distinction between capital and noncapital crimes).
147. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (noting that "[m]any of the
framers of the Constitution had recently experienced the rigors of military life").
148. See id. (noting that framers "were well aware of the differences between it and civilian
life").
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associated with the earliest days of the United States possessed considerable
expertise with respect to military affairs.'4 9 In 1775, George Washington sat
on a committee charged with the task of establishing rules for the operation
of America's military. 5 That same year he became Commander in Chief of
those forces.'' When the Articles of War advocated by his committee proved
insufficient, Washington pushed the Continental Congress for change.5 2 John
Adams prepared the revisions with the support of a committee that included
Thomas Jefferson.'53 Many of these same men were instrumental in the
adoption of the Constitution and also participated in drafting the Bill of
Rights. 54 They too embarked on these tasks with a wealth of personal mili-
tary experience."'
Consequently, the framers possessed a working knowledge of the influen-
tial and the controlling military texts of the time.'56 These men understood the
British Articles of War of 1765, the Massachusetts Articles of War, the
American Articles of 1775, and the American Articles of 1776.' Many
similarities existed between these documents, including the fate of soldiers
accused of capital crimes.'58 Two of the four texts, the British Articles of
1765 and the American Articles of 1776, incorporated provisions requiring
superior officers to relinquish such soldiers to the appropriate civilian author-
ity' 59 Of the remaining two, the Massachusetts regulations provided courts-
149. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text (discussing influential leaders).
150. See Gordon D. Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 71 HARv. L. REV. 293, 297-98 (1957) (discussing Washington's participation
in creation of Articles of War).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. (discussingparticipationofAdamsandJeffersoninrevisionofArticlesofWar).
154. See id. at 299 (citing John Marshall as example of individual who participated both
in Virginia convention for ratification of Constitution and development of Virginia's sugges-
tions for Bill of Rights).
155. See id. (noting Marshall's service in Revolutionary Army).
156. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text (describing some of framers' direct
involvement in drafting of texts).
157. See Henderson, supra note 150, at 298 (describing involvement of Washington,
Adams, and Jefferson in drafting of American Articles and relation of those rules to Massachu-
setts and British documents).
158. See British Articles of War of 1765, § X, art. I, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note
78, at 937; American Articles of War of 1776, § X, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 78, at
964; The Massachusetts Articles of War, art. 49, reprinted in WINTHROP,supra note 78, at 951;
American Articles of War of 1775, art. LI, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 78, at 957.
159. See British Articles of War of 1765, § X, art. I, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note
78, at 937 (providing for relinquishment); American Articles of War of 1776, § X, reprinted
in WINTHROP, supra note 78, at 964 (same).
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martial with general jurisdiction over noncapital offenses and those actions
with the potential to compromise discipline,"6 while the American Articles of
1775 expressly prohibited courts-martial from sentencing anyone to death.'
Taken together, these provisions resulted in a prevailing belief that the
court-martial should not put people to death for common-law capital crimes.
If the duty to impose the death penalty belonged anywhere, it belonged within
the province of the civilian system. That belief persevered for more than one
hundred years. 162
The Supreme Court's decision in Solorio provided support for Justice
Stevens's second distinction between capital and noncapital crimes. 63 Solor-
io's historical analysis included consideration of the British Articles of War
which provided that "[w]henever any Officer or Soldier shall be accused of
a Capital Crime... the Commanding Officer ... [is] hereby required, upon
Application duly made.., to use... utmost Endeavors to deliver over such
accused.., to the Civil Magistrate."'" In Solorio, the Court relied on excep-
tions to these Articles to establish military jurisdiction over civilian crimes."'
Those exceptions, however, did not involve capital crimes."6 Solorio's histor-
ical analysis also discussed the general article of the American Articles of
160. See The Massachusetts Articles of War, art. 49, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note
78, at 951 (providing court-martial jurisdiction over "[a]ll crimes not capital, and all disorders
and neglects... to the prejudice of good order and military discipline").
161. See American Articles of War of 1775, art. LI, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 78,
at 957 (stating that "no persons shall be sentenced by a court-martial to suffer death"). The
Articles excluded from this ban those instances of potential capital punishment for crimes of a
purely military nature mentioned elsewhere in the articles. Id., reprinted in WIINrHROP, supra
note 78, at 957.
162. See WINTHROP, supra note 78, at 691 (noting "the further principle is uniformly
asserted of the subordination, in time of peace and on common ground, of the military author-
ity to the civil, and of the consequent amenability of military persons, in their civil capacity, to
the civil jurisdiction, for breaches of the criminal law of the land"). Winthrop published
America's first complete study ofmilitary law in 1886. Id. at 5. An early commentator whose
influence perseveres, he encouraged practitioners to "discover... that there is a military code
of greater age and dignity and of a more elevated tone than any existing American civil code,
as also a military procedure... well worthy of respect and imitation." Id.; see also Loving v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1741 (1996) (demonstrating Winthrop's continuing influence
by citing WINTHROP, supra note 78); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 442 n.5 (1987)
(same).
163. See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 443-46 (presenting historical discussion).
164. Id. at 443 (quoting British Articles of War 1774, reprinted in DAVIS, supra note 128,
at 589).
165. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing limited exceptions).
166. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing limited exceptions). Instead,
the exceptions included crimes such as destruction of property. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 443 (citing
British Articles of War of 1774, § XIV, art. XVI, reprinted in DAVIS, supra note 128, at 593).
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War of 1776.167 The Court argued that contrary to those who would limit
military justice to cases concerning military discipline, several scholars claim
this article covered all noncapital crimes. 168 Finally, Solorio admits that the
framers knew of Blackstone's opposition to court-martial jurisdiction in times
of peace.1 69 While unpersuasive in the context of considering the service con-
nection doctrine, 170 Blackstone's views take on new significance in light of the
historical disapproval of military intervention in common-law capital crime.
Concurring in Loving, Justice Stevens emphasized the importance of the
question whether courts-martial have jurisdiction over capital crimes in times
of peace.1 71 In many respects, service personnel facing the ultimate penalty
for their crimes mirror their civilian counterparts, and their lives deserve simi-
lar consideration.17 ' To develop a distinction between capital and noncapital
peacetime crimes appears to draw a line where, at the source of congressional
power,'73 one does not exist. Nevertheless, strong historical evidence supports
such a distinction. 74
167. See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 444-45 (discussing general article).
168. See id. (meaning "all noncapital crimes proscribed by the civil law").
169. See id. at 446 n.12 (admitting framers' awareness of Blackstone's views, yet failing
to be "persuaded that their relevance is sufficiently compelling to overcome the unqualified lan-
guage of Art. I, §8, cl.14"). Blackstone expressed his concerns thus:
For martial law, which is built on no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in
it's [sic] decisions, is... something indulged in rather than allowed as a law. The
necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it
countenance; and therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of peace, when the
king's courts are open [for] all persons to receive justice according to the laws of
the land.
Solorio, 483 U.S. at 446 n.12 (quoting I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiEs *413).
170. See Solorio v. United States 435, 446 n.12 (1987) (indicating Blackstone's views are
insufficient to "overcome the unqualified language of Art. 1, § 8, cl. 14").
171. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1751 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(noting that "the question is a substantial one because, when the punishment may be death, there
are particular reasons to ensure that the men and women of the Armed Forces do not by reason
of serving their country receive less protection than the Constitution provides for civilians");
see also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955), quoted in Solorio, 483
U.S. at 440 n.3 (indicating that Congress's power is "the least possible power adequate to the
end proposed"). The Solorio Court pointed out, however, that Toth addressed a more narrow
issue and thus it could restrict the dictum to interpretation merely within the confines of that
case. Id.
172. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1751 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting "importance of
protecting service personnel").
173. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. (delineating congressional power).
174. See supra notes 138-70 and accompanying text (arguing for distinction between
capital and noncapital peacetime crimes).
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IV The Applicability of Post-Furman Jurisprudence to Capital
Punishment Within the Military
If courts-martial do have jurisdiction over capital crimes committed by
service personnel during peacetime, the question becomes whether the same
constitutional requirements that govern the death penalty in civilian courts
also constrain military tribunals. Even if courts-martial lack jurisdiction in
this area, the applicability of those same requirements to situations that call
for military tribunals to adjudge capital punishment for purely military crimes
warrants consideration. Along with the jurisdictional issue,175 the Loving
Court alluded to this second issue as an alternative that might have altered the
outcome of the case. 176 In his concurrence, Justice Thomas went so far as to
remark that "the United States surprisingly makes no argument that the
military is exempt from the byzantine rules that we have imposed upon the
States in their administration of the death penalty."'177 In order to reach a
decision on the delegation question that disposed of Loving, the Court quali-
fied its opinion by assuming 171 the relevance of Furman v. Georgia179 and the
cases following that landmark decision. 8 '
A. Furman v. Georgia and its Legacy
Furman v. Georgia revolutionized the way that states approached the
death penalty.' A majority of the Furman Court failed to agree on reasoning
175. See supra Part III (discussing legitimacy ofpeacetime jurisdiction over capital crimes
in military).
176. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1742 ("A preliminary question in this case is whether the
Constitution requires the aggravating factors that Loving challenges."); id. at 1753 (Thomas,
J., concurring) ("It is not clear to me that the extensive rules we have developed under the
Eighth Amendment for the prosecution of civilian capital cases, including the requirement of
proof of aggravating factors, necessarily apply to capital prosecutions in the military.").
177. Id. n.* (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
178. See id. at 1742 (noting Govemment's failure to raise issue and deciding to "assume that
Furman and the case law resulting from it are applicable to the crime and sentence in question").
179. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
180. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (striking down capital
punishment provisions). In Furman, the Supreme Court considered whether capital punish-
ment, as it was being adjudged, violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 239. Three convicted felons, one standing convicted of murder and
two standing convicted of rape, raised the question. Id All three faced death sentences for their
respective crimes. Id. Collectively, the Supreme Court endorsed no reasoning for its decision
in the case. Id. at 240. Instead, the Justices in the majority filed separate opinions agreeing
with the decision for their own reasons, while the rest of the Justices filed individual dissents.
Id Thus, in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held capital punishment as administered
by Texas and Georgia in the cases before it to be cruel and unusual. Id. at 239-40.
181. See Conners, supra note 14, at 378 (recognizing that Furman, while specifically
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to support its decision."' Nevertheless, courts and scholars alike eventually
designated Justice Stewart's conclusion "that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed" as Furman's holding.' Consequently, the Court did not eradicate
capital punishment from the American justice system." 4 Instead, Furman
sought to ensure that capital punishment would notbe arbitrarily, capriciously,
or irrationally imposed.'85
States responded to Furman with an array of new death penalty legisla-
tion.186 Inevitably, the Supreme Court tested the constitutionality of those
statutes, at times, with mixed results.8 7 In 1976, however, the Court delivered
a series of opinions upholding variations by three states.'88 In the first case,
tailored to three specific statutes, invalidated most death penalty statutes of time). Furman
invalidated all existing state capital punishment statutes. Kevin K. Spradling & Michael D.
Murphy, Capital Punishment, the Constitution, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 32
A.F. L. REV. 415, 415 (1990). Following the decision, death penalty statutes in 35 or more
states received legislative attention. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 180 n.23 (1976); see
Spradling & Murphy, supra, at 416 & n.7 (1990) (citing statistics from Gregg).
182. See Conners, supra note 14, at 378 & n.74 (acknowledging nine independent deci-
sions); supra note 180 (discussing split among Justices in Furman). However, three main
schools of thought are identifiable: (1) those opposed to the death penalty entirely (Justices
Brennan and Marshall); (2) those opposed to the death penalty as administered through these
particular statutes in light of their lack of guidance to juries as to when it is appropriate (Justices
Stewart, White, and Douglas); and (3) those who determined the death penalty, even as admin-
istered in the statutes under consideration, to be a constitutionally legitimate form of punish-
ment (Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun). Conners, supra
note 14, at 378 n.74.
183. Furman, 408 U.S. at310 (Stewart, J., concurring); see Gregory F. Intoccia, Constitu-
tionality of the Death Penalty Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 32 A.F. L. REV.
395, 396 (1990) (attributing freakishness to imposition of capital punishment that is both
arbitrary and capricious); Conners, supra note 14, at 378-79 (noting recognition of holding).
184. See Intoccia, supra note 183, at 396 (finding that Court "stopped short of ruling the
death penalty unconstitutional in all circumstances"); Conners, supra note 14, at 378 (recogniz-
ing that Furman left open potential for constitutional capital punishment).
185. See Intoccia, supra note 183, at 396 (recognizing that capital punishment schemes
must not result in "arbitrary and capricious" sentences); Conners, supra note 14, at 378 (same).
186. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 79-80 n.23 (citing 35 post-Furman statutes); Spradling &
Murphy, supra note 181, at 416 (identifying two primary approaches to problem).
187. See Intoccia, supra note 183, at 396-97 (providing exaimples of statues that were
upheld and statutes that were struck down). In Woodsen v. North Carolina, the Supreme
Court rejected a statute mandating the death penalty. Woodsen v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976). The Court claimed that such a plan inadequately addressed the issues of excessive
discretion and particularized consideration. See Intoccia, supra note 183, at 396-97 (relaying
Court's opinion).
188. See Conners, supra note 14, at 379 (attributing Court's action to statutes' provision
of adequate direction to sentencer); infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text (discussing
holdings in three cases).
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Gregg v. Georgia,"8 9 the Court approved a death sentence imposed following
a bifurcated proceeding that involved evidence of both aggravating and miti-
gating factors, as well as an automatic appeal."90 On the very same day, the
Court handed down decisions in two companion cases, Proffitt v. Florida'
and Jurek v. Texas,"9 with similar results. 93" All three cases emphasized the
189. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
190. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, the Supreme Court considered
whether capital punishment adjudged under Georgia's new law represented an unconstitutional
violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at
158. Petitioner, a hitchhiker, was sentenced to death according to the procedures adopted by
Georgia, following the Supreme Court's decision in Furman, for the robbery and murder of two
men who picked him up. Id at 158-61. Those procedures included a bifurcated proceeding,
the second part of which was to include evidence of both specific aggravating factors and any
mitigating circumstances. Id. at 163-64. First, the Court settled the question of whether the
death penalty is intrinsically cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment
and thus per se unconstitutional. Id. at 169. Determining it was not, the Court reviewed the
history of Eighth Amendment claims, as well as contemporary feelings about the subject. Id.
at 169-73. The Court then proceeded to consider the death penalty as specifically imposed in
this case, which it approved, based on its belief that Georgia's new statute "require[d] the jury
to consider the circumstances of the crime and the criminal before it recommends sentence."
Id. at 197 (emphasis added); see also Intoccia, supra note 183, at 296-97 (discussing Gregg);
Spradling & Murphy, supra note 181, at 416-17 (same).
191. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
192. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
193. See Jurek v. Texas 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). In
Proffitt, the Supreme Court considered whether capital punishment adjudged under Florida's
new law represented an unconstitutional violation ofthe Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 244. Petitioner received the death penalty, according to
the procedures adopted by Florida following the Supreme Court's decision in Furman, for
entering a man's bedroom and fatally stabbing him in his bed with a butcher knife. Id. at 244-
46. Those procedures included a bifurcated proceeding, the second part of which involved
weighing statutory aggravating factors against mitigating factors that were also statutorily pro-
vided. Id. at 246. Once again, the Court, referring to Gregg, dismissed the notion that the death
penalty is per se unconstitutional. Id. at 247. It then proceeded to consider the death penalty
as imposed in the case which, as in Gregg, it approved based on the notion that "the sentencing
judge must focus on the individual circumstances of each homicide and each defendant." Id.
at 252 (emphasis added). The Court noted that the essential distinction between the Georgia
statute approved in Gregg and this statute lay in the fact that Florida placed the responsibility
for sentencing in the hands of the judge rather than ajury. Id. Nevertheless, the Court found
that distinction to be insignificant in light of the fact that the judge's experience level is likely
to lead to greater consistency in sentencing. Id.
In Jurek, the Supreme Court considered whether capital punishment adjudged under
Texas's new law represented an unconstitutional violation ofthe Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 264. Petitioner received the death
penalty according to the procedures adopted by Texas following the Supreme Court's decision
in Furman for the murder by choking and drowning of the 10 year old girl he had abducted with
the intention of raping. Id. at 264-68. Unlike the schemes approved in Gregg and Proffitt,
Texas's procedures required that any individual convicted of one of five categories of capital
murder be subject to a second sentencing proceeding. Id. at 267. If, following that proceeding,
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importance of developing a system premised on serious consideration of the
particular individuals and circumstances involved in each case.19
Cdnsidered together, these decisions answer the questions left by Fur-
man.19 They draw particular attention to five elements that play a central
role in the constitutional analysis: (1) "Bifurcated Sentencing Procedure";
(2) "Specific Aggravating Circumstances Must Be Identified"; (3) "Sentencing
Authority Must... Make Findings On the Particular Aggravating Circum-
stance Used"; (4) "Unrestricted Opportunity To Present Mitigating and Exten-
uating Evidence"; and (5) "Mandatory Appellate Review." '96 One of those
elements, specified aggravating factors, provided the basis on which Loving
reached the Supreme Court some twenty years later.
197
B. Furman, the Military, and Peacetime Common-Law Capital Crimes
Loving did not address the initial inquiry of whether post-Furman death
penalty jurisprudence should even apply within the military context.19 Ap-
parently, the United States Court of Military Appeals (C.M.A.) settled that
question in 1983 with its decision in United States v. Matthews.'99 Finding
the jury unanimously answered a series of statutorily proscribed questions in the affirmative,
the judge was to sentence the individual to death. Id. at 268. Once again, the Court, referring
to Gregg, dismissed the notion that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional. Id. The Court
then proceeded to consider the death penalty as specifically imposed in the case, which it
approved, despite the differences in the Texas statute, based on the notion that it "guides and
focuses the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual
offense and the individual offender." Id. at 274 (emphasis added). Texas's system of narrowing
the types of murder for which the death penalty is available made up for its lack of aggravating
factors, and the questions posed to the jury following the sentencing proceeding encompassed
sufficient opportunity for evidence of mitigating circumstances. Id. at 270-73.
See also Intoccia, supra note 183, at 397 & n.9 (discussing Jurek as well as other death
penalty decisions handed down by Court on July 2, 1976); Spradling & Murphy, supra note
181, at 417-18 (discussing Proffitt and Jurek).
194. See supra notes 190, 193 (quoting pertinent passage of each case).
195. See Spradling & Murphy, supra note 181, at 418 (describing result of capital cases
decided in 1976 as "a basic framework").
196. United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354, 377 (C.M.A. 1983); see id. at 377-78
(discussing each element); Spradling & Murphy, supra note 181, at419 (discussing Matthews's
characterization of these elements); see also Conners, supra note 14, at 380-85 (characterizing
and discussing each element derived from Furman somewhat differently as (1) "Bifurcated
trial"; (2) "Opportunity to present mitigating evidence"; (3) "Guidance to-thejury"; (4) "Appel-
late review"; and (5) "Executive clemency").
197. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1740 (1996) (granting certiorari on
issue of "authority to promulgate the aggravating factors").
198. See supra note 5 (citing Court's recognition of this in Loving).
199. Matthews, 16 M.J. 345 (1983); see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text
(discussing case anditsresults). Subsequentto UnitedStatesv. Matthews, Congressreconstructed
the United States Court of Military Appeals. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ARMED FORCES, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES 1 (June
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Matthews's death sentence improper, the C.M.A. determined thatwithout ele-
ments comparable to those required by Furman and its progeny, the capital
punishment procedures provided by the U.C.M.J. failed to satisfy constitu-
tional requirements."
The appropriate link between civilian precedent and military justice does
not appear to elicit much consideration.20 1 In twenty-four pages, Matthews
devoted a mere three paragraphs to the question.0 2 Despite this discussion's
brevity, the C.M.A. concluded that, with respect to cruel and unusual punish-
ment, service members are entitled to protection on two fronts.23 Accord-
ingly, not only does the Eighth Amendment govern in this area, but Article 55
ofthe U.C.M.J. plays a role as well."' Article 55 prevents courts-martial from
sentencing an individual to "[p]unishment by flogging, or by branding, mark-
ing, or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual punishment."20' 5
Nevertheless, the C.M.A. in Matthews failed to present solid support for
the proposition that the Eighth Amendment directly governs military courts.
2
1
In one reference to a prior holding, the C.M.A. asserted that Article'55 was
designed by Congress to broaden the rights of service personnel rather than
to limit them.207 If Congress understood the Eighth Amendment to create hard
and fast rules regardless of the context in which it is interpreted, then perhaps
civilian precedent does bind courts-martial in death penalty cases. Alterna-
tively, Congress may have passed Article 55 out of a recognition of the unique
requirements of military justice, not in an attempt to absorb military justice
into the civilian system. After all, if Congress expected the same Eighth
Amendment capital punishment rules to control both the courts-martial and
civilian courts, then Article 55 is redundant.
1995). It increased the number ofjudges from three to five in 1990, and in 1994 it changed the
court's name from the United States Court of Military Appeals to the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces. Id. However, for the purposes of this Note, the United States Court of Military
Appeals (C.M.A.) remains the appropriate name because it is the one thatwas in effectatthetime
Matthews was decided.
200. See Matthews, 16 M.J. at 380 (focusing on "lack of specific findings of identified
aggravating circumstances" and impact that has on "meaningful appellate review").
201. See id at 368-69 (discussing link between civilian precedent and military justice).
202. See id. (discussing link in three brief paragraphs).
203. See id. at 368 (concluding that service members are entitled to protection).
204. See id (identifying both sources of protection).
205. U.C.M.J. art. 55, 10 U.S.C. § 855 (1994), quoted in United States v. Matthews, 16
M.J. 354, 368 (C.M.A. 1983). United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. at 368. Note that Article 55
contains specific prohibitions, as well as a general reference to punishments deemed cruel or
unusual. Id.
206. See Matthews, 16 M.J. at 368 (neglecting to assert specific support).
207. See id. (noting that "in enacting Article 55, Congress 'intended to grant protection
covering even wider limits' than 'that afforded by the Eighth Amendment"' (quoting United
States v. Wappler, 9 C.M.R. 23, 26 (C.M.A. 1953))).
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Perhaps in Matthews, the C.M.A. recognized the potential distinction
between the Eighth Amendment and Article 55 when it elected to "seek
guidance from Supreme Court precedent" rather than simply to declare post-
Furman death penalty jurisprudence to be controlling.2"8 In fact, the court
asserted that the uniqueness of the military must play a role in determining
civilian precedent's applicability to the court-martial.2 9 Specifically, the
C.M.A. acknowledged the possibility that circumstances exist under which the
requirements for the proper institution of the death penalty in the case of
members of service personnel will differ from those prescribed byFurman for
ordinary citizens.210 The C.M.A. suggested that crimes perpetrated in combat
situations and those, such as espionage, that amount to a "violation of the law
of war" involve such circumstances.2 ' These exceptions, however, represent
the uniqueness of the military generally, which may so alter the situation as
to nullify the rule and render the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence
merely advisory in the military justice context.
Nevertheless, the C.M.A. found thatthe circumstances surrounding Mat-
thews's crime lacked any elements warranting deviation from Furman princi-
ples. 2 Citing absence of military necessity, the C.M.A. asserted that failure
to follow Furman in such a case would amount to failure to comply with "the
intent of Article 55 or ofthe Eighth Amendment.""2 3 Thus, absent extenuating
circumstances, the C.M.A. has bound itself to civilian precedent. As it-
currently stands, post-Furman death penalty precedent applies to military
capital punishment proceedings absent military necessity.
The Supreme Court did not reviewMatthews, and yet, its holding appears
largely uncontested. Military courts followMatthews,21 4 and even prior to that
decision, federal courts applied Furman to the military as well." 5 In Loving,
the Government did not even consider the issue significant enough to ques-
tion.216
208. Id. at 368.
209. See id. (citing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 520 U.S. 738 (1975), and Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733 (1974)).
210. See id. at 368 (citing combat and law of war as examples).
211. Id. (describing crimes perpetrated in midst of combat as such that "maintenance of
discipline may require swift, severe punishment").
212. See id. at 369 (finding that circumstances of Matthews's crime were "similar [to]
crimes tried regularly in State and Federal courts"); see also supra note 33 (describing rape and
murder committed by Matthews).
213. United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354, 369 (C.M.A. 1983) (emphasis added).
214. See United States v. Martinez, 19 M.J. 744 (A.C.M.R. 1984); Intoccia, supra note
183, at 398 & n.24 (citing United States v. Rojas, 15 M.J. 902, 927 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 17 M.J. 154 (C.M.A. 1984)).
215. See Intoccia, supra note 183, at 398 & n.26 (citing Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256
(1974), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 417 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
216. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1742 (1996) (noting failure); id. at 1753
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Scholarship also glosses over the issue of Furman's applicability in the
military context."7 For example, in 1990, the Air Force Law Review pub-
lished a pair of articles in which military lawyers debated the constitutionality
of capital punishment procedures under the U.C.M.J. as modified following
Matthews."8 While both articles gave fairly extensive treatment to Furman
and the cases that followed it,2 9 neither gave significant attention to the
applicability of those cases to military law. In the first article, this issue
warranted one paragraph that, far from presenting a balanced perspective,
argued solely in support of applicability.' The second simply asserted that
the court in Matthews had "affirmatively answered the question" ofapplicabil-
ity, implying an end to any further discussion of the issue." These scholars,
who could agree on little else,m came to a consensus on this point.'
Despite this apparent consensus among scholars and the courts, the
opinions in Loving indicate that at least some current members of the Supreme
Court - Justice Thomas in particular - hesitate to put the issue to rest.
224
Some persuasive justifications support this reluctance.' The first justifica-
tion finds grounding in courts' longstanding tradition ofdeference to Congress
(Thomas, J., concurring) (same).
217. See Intoccia, supra note 183, at 398 (acknowledging that "[tlo most scholars and
courts, the application to the military of the eighth amendment has never been seriously ques-
tioned").
218. See generally Intoccia, supra note 183; Spradling & Murphy, supra note 181. At the
time of the articles' publication, Major Kevin K. Spradling was the Director of International
Law at the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado. Sprad-
ling & Murphy, supra note 181, at 415. He held a plethora of degrees, including an LL.M. Id.
Captain (Major select) Michael D. Murphy was an instructor with the Military Justice Division
at the Air Force Judge Advocate General School at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. Id.
Major Gregory F. Intoccia was the Deputy Director for Telecommunications Regulatory Law
at the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate at Scott Air Force Base in Illinois. Intoccia, supra
note 183, at 395.
219. See Intoccia, supra note 183, at 396-97 (considering Furman); Spradling &Murphy,
supra note 181, at 415-18 (same).
220. See Intoccia, supra note 183, at 398 (arguing for applicability of Furman and subse-
quent cases).
221. Spradling & Murphy, supra note 181, at 419.
222. See id. at415 (referring to Intoccia's article in terms such as"broad-based attack" and
"polemic," accusing it of" [i]gnoring the all-encompassing analytical framework within which
all capital punishment schemes - including that used in the Armed Forces - must be scruti-
nized").
223. See Intoccia, supra note 183, at 398 (arguing for applicability); Spradling &Murphy,
supra note 181, at 419 (asserting applicability as fact).
224. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text (discussing issue as raised by Loving
and quoting Justice Thomas).
225. See infra notes 226-42 and accompanying text (discussingjustifications for consider-
ing issue of application of civilian judicial precedent in military courts).
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on questions of military affairs? 6 Congress's predominance in the area of
military affairs explains this deference. 7  Exclusive experience places
Congress in a superior position to federal courts with respect to the unique
challenges presented by a large and powerful military - challenges that the
judiciary is unequipped to face. 8
The notion that armed service personnel receive fair treatment under
the court-martial system supports this deference as well. 9 While not the
case from the very beginning,'o the U.C.M.J. now ensures that the military
system of'justice provides numerous opportunities for reconsideration prior
to an execution." Before finalizing any conviction or sentence, the senior
legal officer and then the convening officer at the local level must review all
court-martial decisions. 2 Additionally, two levels of appellate review exist
within the military system to which all capital cases receive automatic
226. See Conners, supra note 14, at 371-75 (discussing judicial restraint and deference to
Congress).
227. See id. at 372 & n.39 (citing Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37
N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 186-88 (1962), reprinted in A.F. JAG BULL., May-June 1962, at 6, 10)
(attributing this sentiment to Chief Justice Warren).
228. See Conners, supra note 14, at 372 (pointing to experience resulting from use of
power). The Supreme Court has stated:
[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting
up channels through which ... grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests
upon the Congress and upon the President of the United States and his subordi-
nates. The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that thejudiciary
be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.
Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953), quoted in Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,
301 (1983).
229. See Conners, supra note 14, at 373 & n.45 (citing Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137
(1953) (affirming death sentence), and Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975)
(asserting that "the military court system generally is adequate to and responsibly will perform
its assigned task.... [I]t must be assumed that the military court system will vindicate service-
men's constitutional rights")).
230. See Ferris, supra note 100, at439 (relaying early example ofunfaimess under original
Articles of War). There was a point in the mid-nineteenth century when military justice was not
necessarily fair. Id. In 1842, a court-martial convicted and executed eighteen year-old Mid-
shipman Phillip Spencer, suspected of conspiring to mutiny, without his ever being aware of
the proceedings taking place. Id. at 439 & n.3 (citing EDWARD M. BYRNE, MILITARY LAW 18
(3rd ed. 1981)).
23 1. See 2 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 18, at 128-30 (describing review process);
Conners, supra note 14, at 373 (same).
232. See 2 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 18, at 128 & n.24 (citing U.C.M.J. arts. 60
(c)(1)); Conners, supra note 14, at 373 & nn.47-50 (citing U.C.M.J. arts. 64, 66-67, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 864, 866-67 (1994)).
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appeal? 3 The number of opportunities for relief within the military justice
system supports civilian courts' confidence in the process. 4
Perhaps the primary justification for exempting courts-martial from the
strictures of post-Furman death penalty jurisprudence lies in the concept of
military necessity." Just prior to the C.M.A.'s decision in Matthews, the
Supreme Court reiterated its belief in the importance of an independent
military justice system. 6 Chappellv. WallaceP recognized that "no military
organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would
be unacceptable in a civilian setting.""2  The demands of battle require
instantaneous compliance with orders. 9 Only prior conditioning can guaran-
tee instant acquiescence under those circumstances.24 Recognizing this,
courts repeatedly permit the application of different, even limiting, standards
regarding the constitutional rights of military personnel.24" ' Individual rights
to freedom of speech, procedural due process, and protection from unreason-
able search and seizure- among the Bill of Right's most treasured principles-
fail to escape limitation.242
233. SeeConners,supranote 14, at373-74&n.51 (citingU.C.M.J. art. 67, 10U.S.C. § 867).
The first appeal occurs within the Court ofMilitary Review ofthe particularbranch ofthe military
involved. Id. at 374 n.51. Ifthe death sentence still stands following that appeal, it is appealed to
the Court of Military Appeals which services all branches. Id.; see also 2 GILLiGAN& LEDERER,
supra note 18, at 129 & n.33 (finding automatic appeal waivable under R.C.M. 1110).
234. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing fairness of military courts).
235. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,300 (1983) (asserting that"military necessity
makes demands on its personnel 'without counterpart in civilian life"' (quoting Schlessinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975))); Conners, supra note 14, at 375-78 (discussing
military necessity).
236. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974),
and Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953)).
237. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
238. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,300 (1983). Chappell concerned the viability of
civil suits brought by enlisted personnel against their superiors for compensation for violation
of their civil rights under the Constitution while in the course of duty. Id. at 297. Claiming
racial discrimination aboard a combat ship, respondents brought a suit that was dismissed by
the United States District Court for the Southern District of California as "nonreviewable
military decisions." Id. at 297-98. Finding a possibility for review, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case. Id. at 298. Reversing the court of appeals,
the Supreme Court placed emphasis on congressional control of the military, as well as the
special needs of military discipline. Id. at 300-01. The Court held that enlisted personnel
lacked the power to bring such suits. Id. at 305.
239. See id. at 300 (referring to "habit of immediate compliance").
240. See id. (citing Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion)).
241. See infra note 242 and accompanying text (providing examples of courts applying
different standards).
242. See Conners, supra note 14, at 375-76 & nn.61-64 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733 (1974) (upholding Captain Levy's conviction, under U.C.M.J. arts. 133 & 134 for, among
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 577 (1998)
C. In the Absence of Peacetime Common-Law Capital Jurisdiction
Assuming courts-martial do not have jurisdiction over common-law
capital crimes committed during periods of peace, the likelihood that the
Supreme Court's post-Furman jurisprudence applies to military capital pun-
ishment decreases considerably. Thus, courts-martial only retain capital
jurisdiction over those crimes that are purely military in nature.243 In Mat-
thews, the C.M.A. specifically reserved the possibility that cases exist that
demand unique guidelines for proper adjudication of the death penalty by
courts-martial.' The C.M.A. cited crimes committed within the context of
war aid those that implicate "the law of war" as examples of such circum-
stances.245 Those distinctions become an important part of the applicability
analysis.
Critical to a successful military, strict discipline demands higher stan-
dards of conduct from service personnel in certain respects than those ex-
pected of the average American citizen. 46 Military crimes inapplicable in the
civilian context include desertion,247 absence without leave (AWOL),2"
dereliction of duty, 49 and conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman."
The U.C.M.J. provides for capital punishment for eight such "crimes of war"
whether or not they actually occur in time of war. 1 These crimes include
mutiny or sedition, 2 misbehavior before the enemy, 3 subordinate compel-
other things, expressing to enlisted personnel his opposition to American involvement in
Vietnam); Burns, 346 U.S. at, 139-40 (plurality opinion) (justifying courts-martial's noncompli-
ance with other court's procedures); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (approving inspections and strip searches conducted without warrants)).
243. See United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354, 368 (C.M.A. 1983) (delineating two
categories of purely military crimes).
244. See id. (suggesting combat offenses and crimes of war); see also supra notes 210-11
and accompanying text (same).
245. Matthews, 16 M.J. at 368. (citing combat offenses and crimes of war); see supra notes
210-11 and accompanying text (same).
246. See DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE
§ 2-1, 54 & n.1 (3rd ed. 1992) (asserting that "[a]n army is not a deliberative body. It is the
executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to
command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier" (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733 (1974))).
247. U.C.M.J. art. 85, 10 U.S.C. § 885 (1994).
248. U.C.M.J. art. 86, 10 U.S.C. § 886.
249. U.C.M.J. art. 92(3), 10 U.S.C. § 892(3).
250. U.C.M.J. art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933; see SCHLUETER, supra note 246, at 54-75 (dis-
cussing each of these sections in turn as well as other similar offenses).
251. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text (setting out eight crimes).
252. U.C.M.J. art. 94, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1994).
253. U.C.M.J. art. 99, 10 U.S.C. § 899 (1994).
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ling surrender, 4 improper use of a countersign, 5 forcing a safeguard, 6
aiding the enemy, 7 spying, and espionage."59 True examination of the
effect of Supreme Court precedent on these examples of military capital
punishment requires an inquiry into the relevance of Coker v. Georgia"6
before courts may inquire as to the effect of Furman.26
Strictly speaking, Coker eliminated capital punishment for rape of an
adult woman.262 In doing so, however, it called into question the viability of
the death penalty for any crime that "in terms of moral depravity and of the
injury to the person and to the public.., does not compare with murder."263
Justice White reiterated the plurality's belief that excessive as well as bar-
baric capital punishment fails under the Constitution.2 Coker cited Gregg for
254. U.C.M.J. art. 100, 10 U.S.C. § 900 (1994).
255. U.C.M.J. art. 101, 10 U.S.C. § 901 (1994).
256. U.C.M.J. art. 102, 10 U.S.C. § 902 (1994).
257. U.C.M.J. art. 104, 10 U.S.C. § 904 (1994).
258. U.C.M.J. art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1994).
259. U.C.M.J. art. 106a, 10 U.S.C. § 906a (1994).
260. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
261. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) (eliminating death
penalty for rape). In Coker, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a Georgia
statute that provided for capital punishment for rapists in light of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 586 (plurality opinion). Already
serving time for rape, as well as murder and various other violent crimes, Coker escaped from
prison and within a matter of hours encountered the victim and committed another laundry list
of crimes. Id. at 587 (plurality opinion). These new offenses included, in addition to escape,
"armed robbery, motor vehicle theft, kidnaping, and rape." Id. (plurality opinion). Following
constitutionally approved procedures, ajury sentenced him to death by electrocution. Id. at
587-91 (plurality opinion). Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens joined the plurality
opinion filed by Justice White. Id. at 586 (plurality opinion). In formulating his opinion,
Justice White considered the attitudes of the public, legislatures and even juries toward the
imposition of the death penalty for rape convictions. Id. at 593-97 (plurality opinion). Justice
White "concluded that a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment
for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 592 (plurality opinion). As compared to murder, Justice White found rape
to be less severe with respect to moral depravity and injury, both the victim's as well as the
public's. Id. at 598 (plurality opinion). Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in judgment,
reasserting their beliefs that capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment in all cases and
completing a majority of the Court that would not approve a death sentence for the rape of an
adult woman. Id. at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 600-01 (Marshall. J., concurring).
262. See id. at 597 (plurality opinion) (determining "death is indeed a disproportionate
penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman").
263. Id. at598 (plurality opinion) austifyinghigherstandardforrapebased in partonthese
reasons).
264. Id at 592 (plurality opinion) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); and Weems
v. United States 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
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the proposition that capital punishment that either fails to serve a legitimate
punitive, aim or appears extreme in relation to the offense does not meet con-
stitutional standards. 65 Coker emphasized both the importance of public and
legislative opinion concerning the status of the sentence over time and jury
response to application of the death sentence in particular circumstances.2"
Capital punishment for crimes of war should survive the plurality's test
laid out in Coker. It certainly does not suffer from a lack of legislative sup-
port. As early as November 7, 1775, the American Articles of War called for
the death penalty for espionage, mutiny or sedition, desertion, misbehavior
before the enemy, and abandoning post.2 67 As noted above, some of the most
influential men of their time - Washington, Adams, and Jefferson among
them - either participated in the drafting of these Articles or the Articles of
1776 that followed shortly and encompassed these same provisions.26 This
tradition of legislative support for capital punishment for certain violations of
the most serious crimes of war continues today under the U.C.M.J.269 Further-
more, the magnitude of the potential injury to the public as a result of these
crimes and their potential to compromise national security lend supportto this
conclusion. Assuming, arguendo, that capital punishment for crimes of war
does not survive the Coker test, it may nevertheless prove permissible. This
result, implicit in the concept of military necessity,27 stems from the Supreme
Court's understanding that:
[t]he need for special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the
consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive system of
military justice, is too obvious to require extensive discussion; no military
organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that
would be unacceptable in a civilian setting.2 '
265. Id. (plurality opinion).
266. See id. (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that "these Eighth Amendment judgments
should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment
should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent").
267. See American Articles of War of 1775, Additional Articles, arts. 1, 5, 6, & 10,
reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 78, at 959-60 (calling for capital punishment for particular
crimes of war).
268. See Henderson, supra note 150, at 297-98 (providing historical background for
American Articles of War). These provisions that had been part of a supplement to the Amer-
ican Articles of War of 1775, became part of the full text of the American Articles of War of
1776. American Articles of War of 1776, § XIII, art. 19, § II, art. 3, § VI, art. 1, § XIII, art. 12,
§ XII, art. 6, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 78, at 961-67.
269. See supra notes 252-59 and accompanying text (listing serious crimes of war that exist
today).
270. See Conners, supra note 14, at 375-78 (discussing military necessity with respect to
limitations on rights of service personnel).
271. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (emphasis added).
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Assuming that capital crimes of war do survive Coker, the Furman line
of cases becomes relevant. The emphasis of those decisions requires that
constitutional capital punishment schemes focus both very specifically on the
particular crime and the individual defendant and more generally on the
relationship between the possible sentence in a given case and the sentencing
decisions of other similar crimes." While capital punishment for crimes of
war would not necessarily comply with the five elements that were the focus
of post-Furman jurisprudence, 3 military necessity renders such compliance
unnecessary where, as under the U.C.M.J., the procedures followed comply
with the dictates ofFurman. Congress designed the extensive post-trial review
process within the military justice system274 "to insure uniformity in sentenc-
ing."'275 The initial level ofpost-trial review provides the convening authority
with the opportunity to commute the sentence to life in prison based on his or
her own interpretation of the facts.276 This provides strong evidence that the
individual defendant and the particulars of the crime receive more than
adequate attention under the U.C.M.J. Moreover, if the facts receive insuffi-
cient consideration at the initial level, the unique aspects of a given case auto-
matically receive complete consideration in subsequent mandatory reviews.277
In addition to crimes of war, the U.C.M.J. provides capital punishment
for five purely military crimes committed in the context of war.27 Three of
these offenses - desertion, 79 assaulting or willfully disobeying a superior
commissioned officer,2"' and misbehavior of a sentinel281 - also constitute
272. See United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354, 379 (C.M.A. 1983) (faulting capital
punishment procedures under U.C.M.L at time). The C.M.A. found that capital punishment
procedures under the U.C.M.J. failed to reveal
whether they have made 'an individualized determination on the basis of the char-
acter of the individual and the circumstances of the crime,' and whether they have
'adequately differentiate[d] this case in an objective, evenhanded, and substantially
rational way' from the other murder cases in which the death penalty was not
imposed.
Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 406 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)); see also Spradling & Murphy, supra
note 181, at 419-20 (quoting Matthews, 16 M.J. at 379).
273. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (listing these elements).
274. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (discussing review procedures).
275. Spradling &Murphy, supra note 181, at422 & n.65 (quoting John L Pavlick, Jr., The
Constitutionality of the U.C.MJ. Death Penalty Provisions, 97 MIL. L. REV. 81, 124 (1982)
(citing S. REP. No. 486, at 28 (1949))).
276. See id. at 421 & n.59 (citing U.C.M.L art. 60(c), 10 U.S.C. § 860(c) (1994)).
277. See id. at 421 & nn.59-61 (citing U.C.M.J. arts. 60(b)-(d), 10 U.S.C. § 860(b)-(d)).
278. See infra notes 279-83 and accompanying text (discussing military crimes).
279. U.C.M.J. art. 85(c), 10 U.S.C. § 885(c).
280. U.C.M.J. art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890.
281. U.C.M.J. art. 113, 10 U.S.C. § 913.
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 577 (1998)
crimes of war and should receive the same treatment as the other crimes of
war discussed above." 2 Ofthose purely military crimes deemed capital when
committed in the context of war, only premeditated-murder and felony murder
are not also crimes of war."3 Presumably, the occurrence of premeditated
murder or felony murder within the context of war adds emphasis to the
presence of military necessity. Nevertheless, murder committed in a theater
of war bears a greater resemblance to the common-law crimes discussed above
than it does to crimes of war. Consequently, the applicability of Furman to
court-martial cases involving murder committed in a theater of war should
parallel that of its peacetime common-law counterpart.
V Conclusion
Loving v. United States will undoubtedly draw the attention of adminis-
trative law professors.2" The true ramifications of this decision, however,
may surprise those who consider its holding with respect to the delegation
doctrine to be the decision's central significance. The alternative issues
presented by the Justices and discussed above contain a kernel of hope for
advocates on both sides of the controversy surrounding the death penalty.285
Loving all but challenged future litigants to raise these issues.286 Once settled,
their impact may affect a variety of different contexts.
One area sure to be implicated is choice of forum. At a point in time
when even the American Bar Association can garner a tremendous amount of
support for a moratorium on the death penalty,287 headlines continue to read,
"Nation's Execution Rate Increases Sharply."28 In fact, recent statistics from
282. See supra notes 272-77 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of Furman
to crimes of war).
283. See U.C.M.J. arts. 118(1), (4), 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1), (4) (1994) (prohibiting premedi-
tated and felony murder); Spradling & Murphy, supra note 181, at 420 & n.42 (including rape).
But see id. at 418 n.28 (explaining ramifications of Coker).
284. See supra Part II (discussing administrative law implications of Loving).
285. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1742 (1996) (noting failure of Govern-
ment to take issue with assumption that civilian capital punishment precedent applies in this
instance); id. at 1752 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reserving question of status of peacetime capital
prosecutions by military).
286. See id. at 1742 (pointing out blatant failure to raise alternate issues discussed in this
Note).
287. See SaundraTorry,ABA Endorses Moratorium on Capital Punishment, WASH. POST,
Feb. 4, 1997, atA4, available in 1997 WL 2249666 (discussing ABA decision). The vote, cast
on February 3, 1997, at the organization's winter meeting, was 280 to 119. Id. This change in
the ABA's policy with respect to capital punishment followed recent federal legislation
concerning habeas review and financial support for attorneys representing indigent defendants
facing capital sentences. Id.
288. Robert L. Jackson, Nation's Execution Rate Increases Sharply, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5,
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the Justice Department indicate that from 1994 to 1995 the number of execu-
tions carried outnationally increased by more than eighty percent, from thirty-
one to fifty-six."' At the end of 1995, inmates awaiting execution on death
row numbered 420 in California, 404 in Texas, 362 in Florida, and 196 in
Pennsylvania."
Public doubts concerning the potential of violent offenders to reform
compound the impact of these statistics.9 ' It follows that, given an option,
many prosecutors as well as the public they represent, would prefer to try
capital cases where the judgment will most likely result in the death penalty.
If courts-martial do not command jurisdiction over common-law capital
crimes committed during times of peace, then choice of forum becomes a
nonissue. If, however, courts-martial have jurisdiction under these circum-
stances, then applicability of Furman to the military becomes an important
factor in the choice of forum decision. Assuming Furman applies, those
seeking the death penalty may prefer to launch prosecutions in the civilian
system where death sentences are far more prevalent. If, however, the Su-
preme Court finds courts-martial exempt from "the byzantine rules ...
imposed upon the States in their administration of the death penalty,"2' then
the potential for modifications to the military system capable of facilitating
the imposition of capital punishment increases. This could make the military
context a more attractive forum for proponents of the death penalty.
Eventually, Loving may also hold implications for nonmilitary capital
defendants. The sentiments of certain members of the Supreme Court, Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas in particular, fuel Loving's potential for impact on
capital punishment generally. These Justices, above all of their colleagues,
tend to oppose decisions that would broaden the liberties of those accused of
crimes.293
During his confirmation testimony on the subject of limiting death
penalty appeals, Justice Thomas expressed "concern... that we do not put
ourselves in the position of adopting an approach that would in some way
1996, at A41, available in 1996 WL 12762646.
289. See id. (citing Justice Department statistics).
290. See id. (noting that "[I]egal experts said California has a disproportionately large
number of death row inmates because federaljudges and the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
in San Francisco have blocked or delayed many executions").
291. See id (indicating fear of recidivism).
292. Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1753 n.* (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
293. See ChristopherE. Smith, The Constitution and CriminalPunishment: The Emerging
Visions ofJustices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKEL. REV 593,598 (1995) (observing that "even
when most of the other conservative Reagan and Bush appointees supported individuals' claims
in criminal punishment cases, Justices Scalia and Thomas were likely to support the govern-
ment").
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curtail the rights of the criminal defendant." '294 Nevertheless, between 1986
and 1993, Justice Thomas favored the Government over individual criminal
defendants more than ninety-four percent of the time in controversies sur-
rounding the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty, and collateral habeas
review."' Justice Scalia opposed criminal defendants in ninety percent of
such cases.296 Justice Scalia envisions a system of capital punishment aimed
at retribution equivalent to the damage done, irrespective of moral responsibil-
ity considerations.297
While their perspectives may appear radical in light of the Court's
current composition, relative youth favors Justices Thomas and Scalia.298
Potentially, their impact on the nation's death penalty policies - both direct
and indirect - will continue for some time.2 Relieving the military justice
system from the strictures of post-Furman procedural requirements could
serve as a testing ground for the position advocated by these conservative
justices. If administered successfully, an example of capital punishment
absent the requirements that followed Furman could provide Justices Scalia
and Thomas with ammunition in their fight to change the way that American
courts must administer the death penalty.
294. Joyce A. Baugh & Christopher E. Smith, Doubting Thomas: Confirmation Veracity
Meets Performance Reality, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 455, 475 & n.90 (1996) (quoting Justice
Thomas, Nomination ofJudge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 424
(1991)).
295. See Smith, supra note 293, at 596 (reporting percentage for all justices serving on
Supreme Court between 1986 and 1993); see also Baugh & Smith, supra note 294, at 475-76
(describing Justice Thomas as "less concerned than other Justices about the constitutional rights
of criminal defendants").
296. See Smith, supra note 293, at 596 (reporting percentage for all justices serving on
Supreme Court between 1986 and 1993).
297. See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 67, 68
(1992) (interpreting Justice Scalia's argument in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)). Gey
went so far as to assert that "[iln Justice Scalia's world, there are few impediments to swift
implementation of death sentences." Id. at 131.
298. See Smith, supra note 293, at 596 (noting reldtive youth of Justices Thomas and
Scalia). Justice Thomas is 46 years old and Justice Scalia is 58 years old. Id.
299. See id. at 596, 610 (discussing potential impact of tenure of Justices Scalia and
Thomas); see also Gey, supra note 297, at 131 (predicting that, "[iun a very short time, Justice
Scalia's death penalty may become the Court's death penalty").
